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Role of Reward Structure in Creativity and Idea Fixation 
 
Goh Jia Hao 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study seeks to investigate the role of team reward structures, namely the equity 
and equality of rewards on team idea fixation, as well as its eventual effects on team 
idea creativity. Through a manipulation of reward structures, distributions of rewards 
differ across various teams, and this is expected to result in changes in individual 
motivation to share ideas within teams. Furthermore, due to the role of motivation in 
team processes, it is expected that team learning and performance goal orientation 
would moderate the relationship between team rewards structure and team idea 
fixation. Results shows that teams in the equality condition are more likely to fixate on 
ideas than teams in the equity condition. A higher degree of fixation in turn leads to a 
decrease in creativity of the ideas. No significant moderation of the relationship 
between team rewards and idea fixation is found for team learning and performance 
goal orientation.  
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In today’s workplace environment, the widespread of globalization requires 
the need to stand out in terms of products and services produced by organizations in 
order to stay competitive. This puts pressure on work demands, making them 
increasingly focused on effective team decision-making, as well as innovation and 
creativity within the whole of work teams in the company (Park, & DeShon, 2010). 
As such, maximizing creativity within teams in the workplace becomes of utmost 
importance in organizations today. Creativity ideas are generally defined as the 
combination of two requirements, usefulness and novelty (Amabile, Conti, Koon, 
Lazenby, & Herron, 1996). However, in the process of generating creative ideas, 
research suggests that the sharing of ideas and solutions to an prior to the 
brainstorming disrupts the idea generation of teams, and to a large extent fixate them 
on a limited scope of ideas (Nijstad, Diehl, & Stroebe, 2003). In these cases, 
suggestions by teams would revolve around a fixed set of ideas, as a result coming up 
with ideas that are possibly useful, but not at all novel.  
Why this this the case? At the individual-level creativity studies, research 
suggests that the provision of ideas prior to creative brainstorming triggers our mind 
to search for associated ideas based on our past experience. In other words, this is a 
form of cognitive heuristic. When presented with ideas, our minds are programmed to 
cognitively search for associated ideas saved in our long-term memory to apply them 
to problems, despite being told to solve these problems creatively (Nijstad, Stroebe, & 
Lodewijkx, 2002). This results in them generating ideas highly similar or ideas 
closely associated to the existing ideas that were provided to them. However, the 
above explanation is still insufficient to account for why some groups are more 
influenced by fixation than others. For instance, in majority of research and 
innovation departments of multi-national companies, research ideas are generated 
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with reference to past products produced by the companies. Despite that, in some 
instances, certain companies such as the Apple Inc and Google are able to encourage 
their employees to avoid fixation, and produce revolutionary ideas different from 
anything the company has produced before (Fitzsimons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimons, 
2008; Girard, 2009). In these companies, one similar defining factor is their emphasis 
on employee motivation and how that serves as a game-changer in promoting 
innovation and productivity within their organizations. Research has also shown that 
motivation plays an integral role in various team processes (Park, Spitzmuller, & 
DeShon, 2013), and thus it is important to examine if motivation does indeed affect a 
teams’ creativity fixation. This research seeks to explore the role of motivation within 
teams, with the use of differential rewards systems, to examine how that affects one’s 
creativity and likelihood of fixation on a creativity task. In addition, the role of team 
level learning and performance goal orientation will also be explored to allow a better 
understanding of the relationship between different reward structures and creativity.  
Rewards in work organizations today 
When investigating rewards in organizations, one key area of interest that had 
been closely studied is the relationship between rewards and the achievement of goals 
(Bandura, 1977; DeShon, Kowlowski, Schmidt, Milner, & Wiechemann, 2004). It 
was argued that rewards serves two main purposes. First, to inform individuals on the 
accuracy and desirability of their actions, and second, to motivate individuals to take 
action (Schunk, 1990). Rewards serves to inform behaviors through the provision of 
different levels of reward to different types of behavior. For example, employees in a 
workplace are able to differentiate the desirable behavior from the undesirable 
behavior based on the amount of rewards allocated. This provides individuals with a 
guide for future behavior. Second, rewards motivates through the creation of a desired 
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end state. In addition, the anticipation of achieving an eventual outcome results in 
increased perseverance towards one’s end goal. This has been well studied in the 
early years of research investigating the effects of rewards, showing that rewards 
promotes motivation and task performance when compared with no rewards 
(McGraw, 1978; Goyen & Lyle, 1971). Furthermore, following the influence of 
expansive research on the goal setting theory, where rewarding of specific, 
challenging goals were found to be more effective compared to vague, easy goals 
(Locke, & Latham, 1990). As such, almost all organizations of today set various key 
performance indicators and distribute rewards based on its member’s ability to meet 
specific, yet challenging goals (Locke & Latham, 2006).  
Team reward structures are commonly conceptualized as reward 
interdependence, affecting one’s cooperative or competitive tendency during the 
pursuit of goals (Deutsch, 1949; Deutsch, 1985). Based on this theory, positive team 
reward independence refers to a state of reward equality, where team member’s 
rewards are equally distributed among team members. In other words, independent of 
individual performance, team members would all receive the same amount of reward 
depending on overall team performance. On the other hand, negative reward 
interdependence refer to a state of reward equity, where team member’s rewards are 
proportionately distributed to individuals depending on their level of performance. As 
such, team members receives differentiated rewards determined via their performance 
in the team task. An equality in rewards has been found in previous research to 
promote a cooperative team environment and more team oriented approach to tasks, 
but has also been found to limit individual effort and promote groupthink (eg. 
DeMatteo, Eby & Sundstrom, 1998; Aime, Meyer & Humphrey, 2010). In the case of 
reward equity, teams are shown to be more motivated by the extrinsic rewards and  
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more competitive (Johnson, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Ilgen, Jundt, & Meyer, 2006),  
though it is also found that such rewards structure is detrimental towards one’s 
intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999). In relation to creativity, rewards 
has been suggested as one of the determinants that is inter-related to idea generation 
in teams, suggesting that reward structures affect team’s motivation and willingness 
to think out of the box (Eisenberg, 1999). In this research, these changes in 
motivations are predicted to likely affect a team’s tendency to fixate on ideas during 
creativity brainstorming.  
In a study by Gordon et al. (2000)’s study, 32 3-member teams consisting of 
college students worked under different reward distributions in a simulation game in 
which team members interacted to manipulate garbage trucks to collect trash in a city. 
In the positive reward interdependenc condition (ie. equality condition), team rewards 
was distributed equally. On the other hand, in the negative reward interdependence 
condition (ie. equity condition), team reward was divided proportionately, with the 
best performing player receiving proportionately more than the least performing 
player. Results from the study found that rewards affects a team’s goal orientation, 
leading to differences in team coorperative and competitive perspective towards the 
tasks given to them. This suggest that team goal orientation potentially interacts with 
rewards, and plays a role in team motivation as well (Park, Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 
2013). 
Team goal orientation  
 Research in goal orientation first emerged in the field of educational 
psychology during the 1970s and 1980s, expanding from previous research in mastery 
and performance goals. It was argued by educational psychologists that individuals 
each possesses a particular orientation towards either learning or performance goals, 
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and seeks to apply this concept to the classroom setting. This led to the incorporation 
of the social cognitive approach in which individuals define themselves based on 
goals, values and beliefs (Markus, 1977). Two different goal orientations were 
proposed, namely learning and performance goal orientation. Individuals with 
learning goal orientation approach tasks with the goal of learning for its own sake, 
while individuals with performance goal orientations takes on tasks in an attempt to 
gain favorable judgments (approach oriented) or avoid negative judgments (avoidance 
oriented) from others. Furthermore, it was argued that these goals were based on 
one’s individual theory of intelligence (Bandura & Dweck, 1985; Elliot & Dweck, 
1988). Incremental theorist, beliefs that intelligence and performance can be 
improved over time with practice, resulting in them adopting learning goals. Entity 
theorist on the other hand, assumes that intelligence and performance are fixed, and 
thus adopts performance goals. The concept was eventually introduced into 
organizational literature in the 1990s, taking reference to research by Dweck (1986) 
and was described as a mental framework that determines how individuals interpret 
and respond to achievement situations (Farr, Hoffman & Ringenbach, 1993; Kanfer, 
1990). 
 The study of goal orientation began aggregating to involve teams at the start of 
the millennium, investigating the roles of team learning goal orientation, team 
performance-approach goal orientation and team performance-avoid goal orientation 
in determining various team outcomes, such as team’s performance (Mehta, Feild & 
Armenakis, 2008; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2003), creativity (Hirst, Van Knippenberg 
& Zhou, 2009; Gong et. al, 2013), feedback seeking behavior (Park, Schmidt, Scheu, 
& DeShon, 2007) and conflict management (Huang, 2010; LePine, 2005). These 
teams can take on one of three types of team goal orientation. A team that seeks self-
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actualization and focuses building competence of the team is considered one with a 
team learning goal orientation. In contrast, a team that seeks high returns and gaining 
favorable judgments is said to be one with a team-performance goal orientation. Last, 
a team that seeks to avoid task failures and prevent negative judgments from others is 
considered to be a team with a team performance-avoid goal orientation (Gong et al, 
2013; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2003).  
However, despite over a decade of research in team goal orientation, the 
construct of goal orientation in relation to teams is still not clearly understood 
(DeShon, & Gillespie, 2005; LePine, 2005). In many past studies, team goal 
orientations were simply deduced from an aggregate of the goal orientations of 
individual members in the group. This method, though seems most convenient and 
logical, is potentially flawed as team level goal orientation need not necessarily 
coincide with individual level goal orientation. In a review paper done on team 
motivation, it was emphasized that it was important for researchers to note the 
distinction between individual and team level goal orientation, and that team goal 
orientation possess unique team level-antecedents (Park, Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 
2013). This finding is replicated across many studies, where team goals are influenced 
not only by individual factors, but other multiple factors as well, that will indirectly 
change the goal orientation of a team. For example, Mehta, Field, Armenakis, & 
Mehta (2008) argued that team members form a team goal orientation through various 
contextual cues, exerting a top-down effect. At the same time, social interaction 
among team members influences individual team goal orientation, exerting a bottom-
down effect. In a separate study, teams with members high in performance goal 
orientation were shown to be able to display team-learning behaviors. In contrast, 
teams consisting of individuals high in learning goal orientation were found to show a 
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lack of learning behaviors under certain circumstances. This disjunction between 
individual goal orientation and team goal orientation was found to disrupt overall 
team performance differently (Hirst, Van Knippenberg & Zhou, 2009). As such, the 
above past research suggests an incomplete understanding of individual level goal 
orientation and team level goal orientation and how it affects overall team 
performance and creativity. Therefore, this research also seeks to explore the 
differential effects of individual and team level goal orientation in relation to how it 
affects fixation within teams, as well as the overall creativity within teams. 
Purpose of study  	 This study aims to investigate how differences in reward structures, in 
particular rewards equality versus rewards equity, results in differences in teams’ 
tendency to fixate on ideas previously presented to them in a creativity idea 
generation task. In a paper by Park, Spitzmuller and DeShon (2013), a theory of 
interdependent regulatory dynamics was proposed. The theory posits the 
interdependence of individual motivations and efforts to team motivation and efforts, 
which results in the achievement of team goals and team outcomes. For example, in a 
paper by Bharadwaj and Menon, 2000, in an attempt to understand creativity in 
organizations, a study is conducted with data from 634 organizations to examine if 
innovation stems from the individual or from the organization as a whole. The results 
indicate that in order to encourage innovation, creativity has to be instituted into the 
entire system as a whole rather to specific sector of the organization as each 
individual, team, or department are inter-related in influencing the level of creativity 
in the organization. This study suggests that at the various levels of an organization, 
changes to one level interact with another level to influence the eventual creativity 
and innovation within the organization as a whole. This finding also supports the 
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theory of interdependent regulatory dynamics, that changes at the individual level 
interacts with changes at the team level, resulting in variable outcomes. Therefore, by 
varying the reward distribution of teams, changes in motivation at the individual level 
to contribute ideas to the team is expected, which in turn changes the overall 
motivation of the team, leading to team outcomes and goals that differ from one 
another.  
 Under the equality condition (positive reward interdependence), team 
members each receives the same amount of reward regardless of team performance. 
Such conditions acts as a feedback loop, prompting individuals to experience a 
reduced motivation to speak up and propose new ideas, as it does not affect their 
eventual individual rewards (Park, Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 2013). Studies have 
shown that the primary drive of individuals, despite being in teams is the desire to 
satisfy their personal needs and to meet their individual goals (Carver, & Scheier, 
1998). Past research has also shown that this form of conflict between individual 
goals and team goals, termed as team asymmetry is extremely prevalent within teams 
in the workplace, and that individual goals often are the ones that takes precedence 
over that of team goals (Pearsall, & Venkataramani, 2015). Furthermore, speaking up 
when there is no need to risks affecting the harmony within teams while not gaining 
any individual benefits (DeMattio, Eby, & Sundstrom, 1998). Studies have suggested 
that it is detrimental to the creativity of teams in situations where teams are expected 
engage in active discussion, but are in contrast with individual goals that does not 
serve to encourage contribution (Kim, MacDuffie, & Pil, 2010; Chen, & Kanfer, 
2006). However, members of a team tend to behave cooperatively and work with the 
team to complete the task in the most efficient way possible despite being individually 
motivated. Research suggests that this coorperative behavior arise because team 
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members are aware that they will only be able to receive their individual reward if the 
team performs and completes the task (Pearsall, & Venkataramani, 2015). For 
instance, one study showed that when teams are rewarded as long as they completed 
the task, teams often chose the easier task to complete as compared to the challenging 
task. However, when teams are told that their rewards depends on how well they work 
as a team, teams are more likely to choose the more challenging task. This behavior 
indicated that depending on team members’ individual motivation, teams select 
solutions to their task most suited in achieving their objectives (Nickerson, & Zenger, 
2004). Thus, under the equality condition, as teams just needs to complete the task 
well to stand a chance for the individual reward, teams are more likely going to 
choose to adopt ideas given to them, rather than risk contributing a drastically 
different idea, which eventually does not possibly increase their individual rewards 
(Paulus, & Nijstad, 2003).   
On the other hand, under the equity condition, individual team member 
receives rewards depending on the quality of their individual performance. This leads 
to a different individual motivation, and thus a different feedback loop, encouraging 
and motivating individuals to voice their opinions, in order to showcase their own 
ideas and allow them to stand out (Park, Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 2013). This puts 
team members in a situation where individuals have to outperform one another, and 
constantly strive to have their ideas accepted as a team idea, as a result generates 
competition within the team (Pearsall, & Venkataramani, 2015). Team goals are in 
turn affected by the competition as well as individual motivations, thus resulting 
individuals striving harder and constantly trying to both generate new ideas during 
their discussions (Beersma, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, & Ilgen, 2003), 
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as a result avoid fixating on ideas given to them. Therefore, the first hypothesis of this 
research is as follows.                                           
H1: Teams in the equality condition are more likely to generate similar ideas to ideas 
previously presented to them than teams in the equity conditions. 
 Creativity is defined as ideas that are both novel and useful (Amabile, Conti, 
Koon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996). As such, when teams become fixated on ideas, their 
ideas are considered less creative. This is so as even though the ideas might still be 
regarded as useful, but are no longer considered novel due to its similarity to past 
ideas generated (Mayer, 1999). Furthermore, research has shown that the degree of 
sharing and idea exchange by members within teams plays a critical role in the 
generation of creative ideas in teams (Paulus, & Yang, 2000; De Dreu, & West, 
2001).  For example, in a study with 149 employee teams in an organization, teams 
that were rated the most creative were teams whose members were constantly voicing 
out suggestions and feedback to one another within the team (Zhou, & George, 2001). 
This emphasizes the importance of the role of speaking up in encouraging team 
creativity in organizations. As seen above, teams in the equality condition are less 
motivated to share amongst one another, while teams in the equity condition are more 
motivated to share their ideas due to differing individual motivation (Paulus, & 
Nijstad, 2003). Therefore, under conditions of greater fixation of ideas predicted in 
the equality condition, teams are likely to be rated less creative. Similarly, when there 
is less fixation of ideas as predicted in the equity condition, teams will likely be rated 
as more creative.  
As such, the second and third hypotheses are as shown below. 
H2: Teams in equality condition are less likely to be rated as creative than teams in 
the equity conditions 
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H3: Teams that fixate on ideas given to them are likely to be rated less creative than 
teams that did not fixate on ideas.  
 In addition, one’s individual motivation is found to be a dynamic process 
within teams, and that it is influenced by multiple other significant factors (Park, 
Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 2013). As such, it is important to consider other motivational 
factors shown to affect team creativity as well (Shalley, & Gilson, 2004). One such 
significant factor affecting one’s motivation in teams is the team’s learning and 
performance goal orientation (DeShon, & Gillespie, 2005). In a study conducted 
across the United States, it was found that teams high in learning behavior were found 
to be more creative. However, both team learning and performance goal orientations 
were found to moderate the level of creativity within teams. Specifically, team 
learning goal orientation attenuate team creativity at high levels of learning behavior, 
while team performance goal orientation decreases a team’s creativity at low levels of 
learning behavior while increasing team creativity at high levels of learning behavior 
(Hirst, Van Knippenberg, & Zhou, 2009). In the case of rewards equality, a lack of 
motivation to share ideas with one another might be moderated by the team’s learning 
goal orientation. Past research has shown that teams with high team learning goal 
orientation results in greater intrinsic motivation within individuals to perform well 
for a task (Wolters, Shirley, & Pintrich, 1996). With greater intrinsic motivation, 
teams are found to be less affected by the motivation of individual reward, but more 
motivated by the opportunity to learn from the experience (Park, Schmidt, Scheu, & 
DeShon, 2007). Such learning behaviors are also found to limit one’s focus on self-
interest and encourage more prosocial behaviors within teams (De Dreu, & Nauta, 
2009). This suggests that members of teams that are high in learning goal orientation 
would likely be willing to share more ideas and suggest new ideas despite a lack of 
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individual reward motivation to do so. For instance, it was found that teams high in 
team learning orientation were motivated intrinsically independent of other 
motivational factors, and this led to increased creativity within organizational work 
teams (Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009). As such, teams with higher learning goal 
orientation is predicted to reduce the effect of idea fixation, and motivate individuals 
to share more of their ideas with one another within the team. These increase in 
sharing by team members will likely lead to an increase in the level of creativity in 
teams with high learning goal orientation (De Dreu, & West 2001). On the other hand, 
when a team possesses a high level of team performance goal orientation, research 
shows that teams becomes highly task oriented (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2003), and 
thus often leads to the team seeking the fastest possible way to complete the task 
(VandeWalle, Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1999). Furthermore, team performance goal 
orientation has been shown to motivate individuals to become highly task focused 
(Janssen, & Van Yperen, 2004), and seek out the most efficient ways to complete a 
task (Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009). In this case, despite being individually motivate to 
perform well for oneself in the task, it is predicted that teams are likely to adopt ideas 
from those presented to them as it allows the task to be completed faster and more 
efficiently when the team is high in team performance goal orientation. As a result, 
teams are more likely to fixate on ideas rather than coming up with brand new ideas 
by the team despite having the individual motivation to do so. As such, the following 
two additional hypotheses are proposed. 
H4: The amount of fixation by teams in the equality condition is moderated by team 
learning goal orientation. 
H5: The amount of fixation by teams in the equity condition is moderated by team 
performance goal orientation.  
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Participants 
Participants for this study are recruited from a pool of undergraduate students 
from a public university in Singapore in exchange for either bonus class credit or a 
cash payment of $6. In addition, participants are presented with the possibility of an 
additional cash reward of $60 given to them at the end of study collection. The study 
collected from a total of 189 individuals, grouped into teams consisting of 3 
individuals each to complete the task. 31 teams were allocated to the equality 
condition, while 32 teams were allocated to the equity condition. The total sample 
size as such consist of a total of 63 teams. 
Methods 		 A team task was adapted from a previously well-established group activity, 
requesting participants to work as a management team member of a theatre named 
Windy City Theatre (Thompson, & Blorniartz, 1996). Within their team consisting of 
3 individuals each, members are requested to go through a set of materials, which 
would allow them to understand their role as a member of the management team. In 
this task, the 3 members of team were simply named either member 1, 2 or 3. 
Participants were each given the same information on 3 aspects of theatre 
management. Participants are given 8 minutes and are required to read and understand 
information from each of the sub-areas, namely advertising, sales and special events. 
After reading up and learning about their individual roles, participants are then 
grouped into their teams of 3 by random assignement.  
As a team, participants will be ushered into a discussion room, and will be 
given some time to introduce oneself, share some personal information about oneself 
to each other, while at the same time be asked to come up with a team name for their 
group. This is so as past research has shown that team members need time to first 
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familiarize themselves with one another so that they would perceive a sense of team, 
which is important for the emergence of various team processes (Harrison, 
Mohammed, McGrath, Florey, & Vanderstoep, 2003). After which, they would be 
informed of the team task. The task requires them to discuss and formulate a solution 
plan for a problem that the theatre is facing. Specifically, teams are informed that the 
theatre is gradually losing its relevance, and teams are required to come up with 
strategies that would attract the younger audience back to the theatres. They are also 
informed that they would need to consider all three aspects of theatre management, 
namely advertising, sales and special events while formulating their decisions.  
 Equality of rewards and equity of rewards (ie. reward interdependence) is 
manipulated at this point of the study. The manipulation is adapted from Dang (2004), 
by varying the amount of cash reward participants would receive at the end of the 
study. Teams are informed before the start of the final task that if they were to rank 
among the top 25 percent of all performing teams, they would win an additional cash 
bonus of $60 on top of their existing credits or cash they are receiving in the study. 
Two reward conditions are used. In the equality reward condition, team members 
were told that the reward would be equally distributed among each team member. In 
this case, each member would receive $20 if his or her team won the cash bonus. In 
the equity reward condition, team members were told that the team reward would be 
divided differentially. In this case, the top performer of the team would receive $30; 
the middle receives $20; and the bottom performer receives $10. Participants are also 
informed in both conditions that their individual performance would be determined 
via inter-peer rating done at the end of the study. This was done to allow consistency 
in methods across both conditions.  
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After the introduction of the rewards, teams were first presented with two 
ideas, and are informed that these ideas are solutions generated by teams who had 
completed the task previously and are there for their reference. The two ideas given to 
the teams are 1) “Creating increased interaction between celebrities and members of 
audience” and 2) “Promoting theatre through schools to reach out to a larger group of 
audiences”. At the end of their discussion, team members are required to summarize, 
integrate and propose their ideas in the form of an integrated team plan within their 
given booklet. The participants are then asked to answer a series of questions, 
including rating of their peers as well as a team goal orientation measure shortly after 
they complete the task.  
Measures 
State team goal orientation. A 16-item self-report questionnaire investigating 
team state goal orientation was used in this study (Bunderson, & Sutcliffe, 2003). 
Items are measured on a 5 point Likert scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). This scale was originally developed by Vanderwalle (1997) to measure team 
goal orientation, and was subsequently adapted and modified by Bunderson and 
Sutcliffe (2003) for purposes of measuring team state goal orientation. Examples of 
team learning state goal orientation items include “Right now, my team hopes to gain 
a broader and deeper knowledge on this task” and “”. Examples of team performance 
state goal orientation includes “Right now, it is important to my team to do better than 
the other team on this task” and “My team is striving to demonstrate our abilities 
exceed those of other teams on this task”. The team state learning goal orientation and 
team state performance goal orientation has a Cronbach’s alpha of is .95 and .90 
respectively. The scale has a rwg value of .98, with ICC (1) of .14 and ICC (2) of .61, 
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suggesting the scale has both high within group agreement and a reliable team level 
mean aggregation.   
Team idea similarity Team idea similarity is measured through ratings by three 
independent coders, blind to the manipulation condition of the teams. The coders 
were first asked to attend a briefing session, where the two ideas that were given to 
the teams were shown to the coders. Following that, coders were informed of key 
ideas to look out for when rating each of the teams’ ideas for similarity. The coders 
were then asked to do a few practices coding to ensure similar understanding of the 
coding requirements. Coders were asked to rate the team ideas for similarity on a 
scale of 1-7, with 1 being least similar and 7 being most similar. The similarity rating 
of idea 1 and idea 2 were added together to form a combined similarity score, 
representing the similarity of the team idea to the two different ideas that were given 
to teams for reference. As there were 3 coders involved in the coding, inter rater 
reliability ICC was assessed using a two-way mixed, consistency, average-measures 
ICC (McGraw & Wong, 1996) to assess the degree that coders provided consistency 
in their idea similarity ratings across teams. The resulting ICC was in the excellent 
range, ICC = 0.91 (Cicchetti, 1994), indicating that coders had a high degree of 
agreement and suggesting that similarity of idea was rated consistently across teams. 	
	
Team creativity Team creativity is measured through ratings by 3 independent 
coders, blind to the manipulation condition of the teams. The coders were first briefed 
on the definition of creativity, defined as ideas that are both novel and useful 
(Amabile, Conti, Koon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996).. Examples of ideas that are 
considered creative and not creative were then shared with the coders to ensure a 
common understanding of what constitutes a creative idea. are rated along a scale of 1 
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to 7, with 1 being the least creativity and 7 being the most creative. During the 
briefing with the coders, a rating rubric was developed for reference of the coders 
when doing the creative ratings. Similarly, there were 3 coders that rated the ideas for 
team creativity as well. Therefore, inter rater reliability ICC was assessed using a two-
way mixed, consistency, average-measures ICC (McGraw & Wong, 1996) to assess 
the degree that coders provided consistency in their creativity ratings across teams. 
The resulting ICC was in the excellent range, ICC = 0.82 (Cicchetti, 1994), indicating 
that coders had a high degree of agreement and suggesting that team creativity was 
rated consistently across teams as well. 
 
Results 
 
 To examine hypothesis H1, an independent samples t-test is conducted to test 
if the combined similarity scores of teams in the equality condition are significantly 
different from teams in the equity condition. Given a violation of Levene’s test for 
homogenous of variance, F (1,61) = 8.24, p < .01, a t-test not assuming homogeneous 
variance is used. Results show that there was a significant difference in the scores for 
similarity scores for equality (M= 10.84, SD=1.29) and equity (M= 2.94, SD= .84) 
conditions; t (51.1)=28.56, p < .001. The effect size (d = 5.22) was found to exceed 
Cohen’s (1988) convention for a large effect (d= .80). Therefore, the results indicate 
that H1 is supported, where individuals in the equality condition (M = 10.84, SD = 
1.29) produced more similar ideas and are more likely to fixate on ideas given to them 
than groups in the equity condition (M = 2.94, SD = .84). 
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Table 1. Results of independent samples t-test for Similarity of Ideas 
Similarity of ideas      Levene’s Test for Equality 
of Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
 F Sig. t df                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Sig.
Equal variances assumed 8.24 .006* 28.75 61 .00* 
 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
   
28.56 
 
51.1 
 
.00*                                                p	<	.05*	
	 	
An independent samples t-test is conducted to test for H2, determining if the 
creativity ratings of teams in the equality condition are significantly different from 
teams in the equity condition. Results show that there was a significant difference in 
the scores for similarity scores for equality (M= 4.21, SD= .99) and equity (M= 4.98, 
SD= .98) conditions; t (61)= -3.06, p < .005. The effect size (d = .96) was found to 
exceed Cohen’s (1988) convention for a large effect (d= .80). Therefore, the results 
indicate that H2 is supported as well, where individuals in the equality condition (M = 
4.21, SD = .99) produced ideas rated significantly much less creative than groups in 
the equity condition (M = 4.98, SD = .98). 
 
Table 2. Results of independent samples t-test for Team Creativity 
Similarity of ideas      Levene’s Test for Equality 
of Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
 F Sig. t df                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Sig.
Equal variances assumed .80 .778 -3.06 61 .00* 
 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
   
-3.06 
 
60.88 
 
.00*                                                p	<	.05*		
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A simple linear regression was calculated to test for H3, predicting that team 
creativity changes depending on team idea similarity. In other words, it is predicted 
that the degree in which teams fixate on ideas given to them affects the creativity 
ratings of the idea. A preliminary analysis was performed to ensure there was no 
violation of the assumption of normality and linearity. It was found that the similarity 
ratings of ideas significantly predicted the team creativity rating, b = -.101, SE = 
.03,  t (61) = -.396 , p < .005. Idea similarity also explained a significant proportion of 
variance in creativity scores, R2 = .157, F(1, 61) = 11.326, p < .005. This indicates 
that H3 is supported, that the more similar ideas generated are to ideas suggested to 
the teams, the lower the ratings are in terms of creativity. The creativity rating 
increases by .101 per one point decrease in similarity score. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Team Idea Similarity and Team Creativity 
  N         Maximum Minimum     Mean     SD 
 
Team Idea Similarity 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Equality (Positive Inter-D) 31 13.00 4.00 10.84 1.29 
Equity (Negative Inter-D) 32 9.00 2.00 2.93 0.84 
 
Team Creativity 
     
Equality (Positive Inter-D) 31 5.67 2.00 4.21 .99                                                 
Equity (Negative Inter-D) 32 6.66 2.33 4.78 .98         
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In addition, a multiple regression analyses was done to examine if the idea 
fixation seen in the different reward conditions are indeed moderated by team 
performance and learning goal orientation. The values for team learning and 
performance goal orientation were first centered, in which the mean value is adjusted 
to be zero. This process of standardization minimizes the impact of collinearity on the 
data. In addition, as the reward conditions are categorical in nature, the two conditions 
(equity and equality) are dummy coded before the multiple regression analysis is 
done.  To test for H4, in which team learning goal orientation was predicted to 
moderate the effects of reward equality on idea fixation, team learning goal 
orientation and the dummy coded reward condition is included in the first step to 
predict any effects of team learning goal orientation and fixation on team’s idea 
fixation. In the second step, an interaction term between the dummy coded reward 
condition and team learning goal orientation was used to test for any potential 
interaction effects between the two variables. The results showed that the addition of 
the interaction term did not	explain	a	significant increase in variance for idea fixation, 
ΔR2 = .01, F (1, 59) = 1.28, p = .262. This shows that team learning goal orientation is 
not a significant moderator of the relationship between the team reward condition and 
idea fixation. Thus, the hypothesis H4 is rejected. Following on, to examine 
hypothesis H5, the above procedure was repeated, substituting team learning goal 
orientation for team performance goal orientation, and changing the respective . 
Based on the hypothesis H5, it is expected that team performance goal orientation 
moderates the effect of reward equity on idea fixation in teams. In this case, results 
also showed that an addition of interaction term to the model does not explain a 
significant increase in variance predicting idea fixation from reward structure as well, 
ΔR2 = .00, F (1, 59) = .28, p = .598. This indicates that team performance goal 
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orientation is not a significant moderator of the relationship between reward structure 
and idea fixation, and H5 is rejected as well. The below table shows a summary of 
results for the multiple regression. 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses for Predicting Team Learning and 
Performance Goal Orientation as Moderators 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 B   (SE) P  B   (SE) p 
Team Learning Goal Orientation      
    Reward structure 7.767 (.313) .000*  - - 
    Team Learning Goal Orientation  .149 (.166) .373  - - 
    Interaction Term (Reward*TLGO) - -  0.377 (.333) .262 
      
Team Performance Goal Orientation      
    Reward structure 7.817 (.350) .000*  - - 
    Team Performance Goal Orientation -.074 (.192) .700  - - 
    Interaction Term (Reward*TPGO) - -  .205 (.386) .598 
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Discussion		
  This study serves to identify a few key findings that would serve to advance 
our understanding of the role of rewards  and its effects on idea fixation and creativity 
within teams. The concept of idea fixation has majority of its roots in the area of 
cognitive psychology, and is rarely explored in the context of organizational behavior 
and team creativity idea generation (Paulus, & Nijstad, 2003). First, this study 
highlights the role of reward structure (equity vs equality) in relation to teams and 
how it affect’s idea fixation. Specifically, it was found that teams in the equality 
conditions were more likely to fixate on ideas readily available to them than teams in 
the equity condition. Past research has shown that rewards serves as one of the 
strongest non-intrinsic motivator for goal striving, (DeShon, Kowlowski, Schmidt, 
Milner, & Wiechemann, 2004), and that one’s individual benefits and needs are 
always prioritized over team goals (Carver, & Scheier, 1998). Therefore, in 
combination with evidence from past research, this study asserts that depending on 
the reward structure of the team, one’s individual motivation would differ. This in 
turn affects how the teams work together and brainstorm for ideas. This has two 
important implications for future creativity research. One, in examining creativity of 
teams, it is important to consider the possible presence of idea fixation in the task. In 
certain situations, it might not be that teams are not creative, but that due to fixation, 
their ideas are scoped based on the possible solutions presented to them. Two, due to 
the dynamic nature of teams, this also brings up the need to examine the nature of 
team design in creativity task. In this study, it is shown that although the eventual 
team reward given to the team is the same (total of $60), by simply varying the 
reward structure of the team, it has influence on the team processes, and the eventual 
team outcome. As such, it is important for us to consider all aspects of team design 
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while conducting studies on team creativity, as teams are not only affected by what is 
given to them, but also how teams are structured and formed.  
Second, this study found that the amount of fixation by teams is directly 
related to the creativity ratings of ideas generated by the teams. In the study, it was 
shown that the greater the fixation by teams (ie. the more similar ideas are to those 
suggested), the less creative the ideas are being rated. This suggests that fixation has 
practical implications on innovation and creativity within teams. As discussed earlier, 
creativity and innovation within the workplace today is an important consideration for 
many organizations in their team management strategy (Park, & DeShon, 2010). 
Furthermore, this study also indicates that fixation plays an integral role in 
determining the eventual quality and creativity of ideas generated in creative work 
teams. This has implications on future study designs, as well as possibly suggest the 
role of fixation as a moderator and mediator of  various creativity related team 
processes. In addition, in situations where teams fixate on ideas, the ideas generated 
by teams are often still highly useful, but no longer as novel. In the field of creativity 
research, creativity is commonly defined as ideas both useful and novel (Amabile, 
Conti, Koon, Lazeenby, & Herron, 1996). However, in this case, ideas were found to 
be significantly much less creative when ideas lose its novelty, but not its usefulness. 
This highlights the need to look into the role the individual dimensions of creativity 
play in determining overall creativity. In other words, is creativity a function of both 
novelty and usefulness, or is novelty a dimension that is disproportionately more 
influential on the perceived creativity that creativity?  
Third, this study aims to examine the role of motivation, in particular the role 
of team learning and team performance goal orientation in the process of fixation, and 
eventually on team creativity. Based on the theory of interdependent regualatory 
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dynamics, it was suggested that individual motivations within teams, influences the 
goals of the team as a whole and thus, results in different outcomes (Park, 
Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 2013). In an attempt to elucidate a better understanding of 
this theory, the study looked at the role of goal orientation in moderating the degree of 
idea fixation within teams. However, although results of the analysis returned with no 
significant interaction effects, this still serves to highlight important considerations in 
terms of the effects of goal orientation on the fixation of ideas, as well as on creativity 
of teams. Past studies has repeatedly shown that team goal orientation has a 
significant effect on various team processes such as feedback seeking (VanderWalle, 
& Cummings, 1997; VandeWalle, Ganesan, Challagalla, & Brown, 2000), goal 
setting (Phillips, & Gully, 1997) and team adaptability (Kozlowski, Gully, Brown, 
Salas, Smith, & Nason, 2001). Therefore, it is highly likely that team goal orientation 
does have an effect on the degree of idea fixation and team creativity. The failure to 
find a significant effect in this study could possibly due to a few reasons. First, it 
could be due to an error in the aggregation of team learning goal orientation measure 
used. In this study, based on a paper by Chan (1998), an additive model is used in the 
aggregation of team goal orientation. However, in an additive model, it does not 
necessarily account for individual differences within the team. In other words, while 
certain individuals can possibly perceive high learning goal orientation, others in the 
team can perceive a low learning goal orientation. In such cases, an aggregation of the 
individuals within the team results in the team having a moderate team learning goal 
orientation, despite having individuals both high and low in learning goal orientation. 
Alternatives to this could be to measure goal orientation at the individual level, and 
aggregate the results using the direct-consensus or referent-shift consensus models. In 
this case, team goal orientation would be based on agreement between team members, 
ROLE	OF	REWARD	STRUCTURE	IN	CREATIVITY	AND	IDEA	FIXATION	 	 		
	 25	
rather than an average of individual ratings. Second, the failure to find an effect of 
team goal orientation could be due to the way goal orientation is measured. Being a 
30 minutes study, teams might not have sufficient time to accurately evaluate and 
judge the perception of goal orientation in teams. In these cases, it might be more 
effective for team goal orientation to be determined via an objective rating by coders 
through watching the teams interact in the videos that are taken during the 
experiment.  
This study is not without its limitation. First, studies have shown that by 
simply examining reward structures, it does not provide a full account of the effects 
on team processes. In fact, it has been shown that team reward structures interacts 
with different team task structure, of the team take on differ resulting in a variation of 
team outcomes (Dang, 2004). Examples of such team task structure include different 
forms of role division within the teams, or different nature of task. As such, future 
studies should explore how team task structures interacts with team reward structures 
to affect fixation of ideas, as well as team creativity. Second, in this study, due to 
limitations in time and resources, the study largely focuses on identifying team level 
antecedents such as team rewards, as well as team level effects, such as team idea 
fixation and team creativity. However, as team processes is one which is multi-level, 
and dynamic, it is important to examine cross-level effects. For example, effects of 
team rewards on individual level outcomes such as individual self-efficacy, 
motivation and affect could be examined. In turn, these individual level outcomes can 
possibly serve as mediators to explain team level outcomes. Third, due to limitations 
in time and resources, teams are put through a 30 minutes task, with minimum time to 
understand the nature of the team and teammates fully. In a review of teams by 
Erickson and Gratton (2007), it was found that teams need about 20 to 30 minutes 
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before individual members begin to understand the nature of each member of the 
team. As such, future studies could also explore team tasks which are longer in 
duration, allowing ample time for teams to get to know one another, as well as allow 
us to more accurately evaluate the team processes occuring within these work teams.  
Conclusion 
  In summary, the findings in this study serves to provide a foundation for 
future explorations in team creativity research. Consistent with the theory of 
interdependent regulatory dynamics (Park, Spitzmuller, & DeShon, 2013), team 
processes is one which is dynamic and intedependent on one another to affect team 
outcome. Team reward structure results in changes in individual goals, which lead to 
changes in team goals (fixation of ideas), and eventually affects the creativity ratings 
of ideas by the team. The result also seek to highlight the importance of examining 
and considering the possibility of idea fixation in team creativity tasks, as well as the 
role of motivation in affecting one’s tendency to fixate on existing ideas. All in all, 
these findings contribute to advancing the understanding of the team creative process, 
in particular the effects of different team rewards on the tendency for teams to adopt 
ideas from those suggested by others, as well as how that leads to more/less creative 
ideas.  
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